Primo Levi’s ethical testimony on the grey zone

the problem of judgment and representation

Abstract

This article problematizes the ethical character of Primo Levi’s literary testimony on his experience in Auschwitz. The narrative of the Italian writer offers us important insights to understand not only the Lager as a space of desubjectivation, but also outlines the role played by Nazi machine in fabricating archetypal figures with poorly defined moral shapes within concentration camps. The intention here is to examine the intricate phenomenon of “grey zone,” the paradigmatic figure of the “Muslim,” and the tragic case of Hurbinek, a child of death. The cases indicate the risk of judging these figures – who compose themselves the nebulous space of moral indeterminacy – with the measures of the present and without considering the empirical circumstances to which they were submitted. Levi argues that it is necessary to take into consideration the blind spots that define the boundaries of the grey
zones of traumatic events, from which social roles tend to be confused, mainly due to the perpetrators' strategies of imputing guilt and responsibility to the victims.