Reviving the project of Spanish-American Confederation: 
the Family Pact and the road to the Lima Congress (1831-1847)

Germán A. de la Reza

Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana (UAM) – câmpus Xochimilco, Distrito Federal, México
Investigador Nacional – Sistema Nacional de Investigadores, Nível III
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4749-5461
E-mail: delareza@hotmail.com

Abstract: This article studies the Family Pact raised in 1831 by Lucas Alamán and its role in recovering the ideal of the Spanish-American union between the failure of the Congress of Panama in 1826 and the American Congress of Lima in 1847. It defends its relevance for a better understanding of the early stages of the Inter-American System, and the marked aspects of the Mexican defensive strategy on the eve of the North-American War of 1846-1848.

Keywords: Family Pact; History of Inter-American Relations; Lima Congress; Panama Congress; North American War.

Revivendo o projeto da Confederação Hispano-Americana: Pacto Familiar e o caminho para o Congresso de Lima (1831-1847)


Palavras-chave: Pacto Familiar; História das Relações Interamericanas; Congresso de Lima; Congresso do Panamá; Guerra da América do Norte.

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Introduction

On December 7, 1824, two days before the Battle of Ayacucho, Simon Bolivar sent an invitation from Peru to the governments of Greater Colombia (Colombia), Mexico, Central America, Rio de la Plata and Chile to participate in the Congress of Panama (BOLIVAR, 1966, p. 211-214). After some setbacks, the Areopagus met on the Isthmus in June 22, 1826, and continued its tasks for three weeks until July 15, 1876. The objective was to create a Plenipotentiary Assembly endowed with
negotiating faculties, and raising a common army capable of facing the threat of reconquest by Spain; a defensive alliance that sought to institutionalize itself in its narrowest expression, a Confederation that aimed to balance relations between the Hispanic American republics and its former mother country, supported by the Holy Alliance. The sessions were attended by ministers from Colombia (present-day Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela), Peru, Mexico and the Central American Federation (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua). Great Britain and the Netherlands were also represented by an official observer and an unofficial observer, respectively.¹

After signing the confederal treaties, the ministers decided to move the Assembly to Tacubaya, a town near Mexico City, because of the yellow fever epidemic then afflicting Panama. The ministers traveled to the Mexican capital and waited two years for the ratification of the treaties; in the end, they had to cancel the confederal project. One might have thought that the ideal of confederation would not survive its initiator, who died in December 1830, but the Mexican government took over the post of Hispano-American unionism in the early days of 1831. This diplomatic enterprise is known as the Family Pact and will last more than a decade and prepare the conditions for the next American Congress in 1847. It was designed by Lucas Alamán, the famous Mexican chancellor, leader of the conservative party, pioneer of modern mining, influential historian and the strategist of the Mexican diplomacy during the first decade of Independence. In general terms, the Family Pact extracted most of its content from the Mexican experience of the Panama Congress.²

This article deals with the efforts to revive the ideal of unity from the failure of the Tacubaya Assembly to the installation of the American Congress in Lima. Our approach aims to clarify an almost ignored stage in inter-American relations marked by the first wars between Spanish Americans, the internal fracture of several of them and the debt crisis, and the (apparent) lack of regional solidarity, among other factors. To this end, we have structured this paper in five sections: the first describes the Family Pact in its various components; the second, third and fourth sections deal with the itinerant missions of the Mexican ministers over twelve years, including the complications the disappointing results; the last section studies the general aspects of the resulting American Assembly in Lima. Overall, the article defends the relevance of the Family Pact for a better understanding of the
early stages of the Inter-American System, and prominent aspects of the Mexican diplomacy on the eve of the North-American War of 1846-1848.

The start of the mission

On his return to office in 1830, Chancellor Lucas Alamán prepared a three-phase confederation project named “Family Pact” by contemporary historiographers. The first phase consisted in the creation of a trade system among the Spanish-American republics. In January 1831, he entrusted this task to Miguel Ramos Arispe, former Minister of Finance and the father of Mexican federalism. Ramos prepared a draft treaty with an explanatory memorandum, and on March 7 he signed the Treaty of Trade and Friendship between Mexico and Chile with Joaquín Campino, the former Chilean Chancellor. To a large extent, it was the equivalent of the bilateral treaties that Colombia had concluded in preparation for the Panama Congress.\(^3\) Article 14 provided for the appointment of a delegate to the Hispano-American Assembly, and the annex seemed to replace the most-favored-nation clause with a “Hispano-American preference” stipulation.\(^4\)

The second phase began in May by sending a circular to the governments of Colombia, Rio de la Plata, Central America, Chile and Peru: the aim was to bring together an Assembly of Representatives of countries bound by “the same interest [which is], nothing less than their existence as nations”. To avoid the problems that had led to the “dissolution” of the Panama Congress, Alamán suggested limiting the number of participating countries without inviting third countries. He did not say which ones expressly, but in his instructions, he referred to the United States and England as nations “with commercial and political interest’s contrary to our own, and therefore likely to paralyze our own objectives” (SRE, 1962, p. 131). Accordingly, he proposed that:

The meeting should be held without the pomp and circumstance of a Congress, but it should take the form of open sessions, of a private nature, which would be held according to necessity. This would require that the representatives of each of our Republics meet in one of our capitals, and that they have the power to deal with common interests (SRE, 1962, p. 124-125).
On June 3, 1831, Alamán launched the third part of his plan: he appointed Manuel Diez de Bonilla and Juan de Dios Cañedo as extraordinary and plenipotentiary ministers to the entire group of Spanish-American governments. As we will see, in the years to come, the itinerant diplomacy would become the central axis of Family Pact.

The purpose of these embassies was set by a series of instructions, some of which were general, others secret or special. The general instructions referred first of all to the most-favored-nation clause and its consequences. This artificial reciprocity, wrote Alamán, transferred “all the benefits of our commercial activity to countries that are totally foreign to us, completely indifferent to our fate, and only interested in what they can get from us” (SRE, 1962, p. 129-137). He proposed to neutralize the negative effects of this clause by adopting as a model the treaty he had just signed with Chile. Then came the main topics to be dealt with by the Assembly: the bases for negotiations with Spain; the bases for recognition by the Vatican; the bases for establishing new treaties with foreign countries; the basis for negotiating trade agreements among Spanish-American countries; reciprocal commitments on the defense of the independence of each country; ways of avoiding conflicts and methods of conciliation among brotherly countries; finally, the criteria for establishing borders in a safe and peaceful manner.

On the first point, Alamán suggested to negotiate a truce with Spain, postponing the final agreement. With regard to future agreements with third countries, which he considered important for obtaining diplomatic recognition, he recommended limiting their validity to ten years. Thus, “after a few years the governments of the region will have their hands free, and will be able to renegotiate” their commitments (SRE, 1962, p. 133). Further on, he also advocated the idea of a common citizenship for the confederated republics and a single flag for the fleet. On other matters, he asked that “what was negotiated in the Congress of Panama” be taken into consideration with some minor modifications. Otherwise, he seemed particularly cautious about one point: the explanations that should be given to the countries that are foreign to the Hispano-American “family”. With regard to Brazil, which was foreigner by virtue of its political regime, but whose path to independence and culture was similar, Alamán favored of its presence, provided that Brazil did not intervene in the decision to remove the United States from the Congress. “We must never forget,” he reminded his emissaries, that “it is in our best interest” to avoid the presence of our northern neighbor (SRE, 1962, p. 134). 
The confidential instructions, which were shorter than the others, indicated two essential objectives for Mexico (SRE, 1962, p. 138-139): on the one hand, to host the Assembly in Tacubaya without arousing suspicion of the country’s alleged desire “to exert influence or preponderance over the other republics”; on the other, to oppose in a skillful and attentive manner the hegemony the United States was gradually beginning to exert over Hispano-American countries. These two missions marked Alamán’s position regarding a neighbor he knew well, since he had to reject its insistent offer to buy Texas channeled by Joel R. Poinsett, the first U.S. ambassador to the country, and his successor Anthony Butler, an unscrupulous diplomat obsessed with the conquest of the Mexican territory (LAMAR, 1988, p. 1-17).

The special instructions also dealt, in the case of Diez de Bonilla, with the negotiation of trade treaties with Central America and Colombia (SRE, 1962, p. 139-143). With regard to Central America, he requested detailed information on the situation of Soconusco and Petén, territories claimed by Central America. Regarding Colombia, he recommended that a letter should be sent there before any travel, “because if there was no government, there was no point in travelling”. However, if the country still had a legitimate administration (it faced a process of disintegration), the trade agreement signed by Miguel de Santamaria and Francisco de Arrillaga in 1824 should be updated, and Colombia’s debt, settled (SRE, 1962, p. 96-98).5

The instructions sent to Cañedo were more detailed and considered three issues: the relationship with the countries of the Southern Cone, the signing of trade treaties, and the appointment of the Plenipotentiary Assembly (SRE, 1962, p. 165-175). Alamán was convinced that Peru maintained a hostile attitude towards Colombia over Guayaquil, and that it was also seeking to annex Bolivia, which it considered an integral part of its territory. On these two problems, the Mexican Chancellor recommended his emissaries to put forward peace proposals, explaining that the repeated quarrels weaken countries and “will make them fall under the blows of the enemies of independence, the only ones to benefit from our imprudence” (SRE, 1962, p. 167).

Cañedo was in charge of negotiating with the government of Argentina, a country torn by the conflict between its powerful capital and the Rio de la Plata provinces. He also had to observe the progress of European immigration and compare it with the situation in southern Mexico, where these settlements were
carried out too slowly. In Chile, the aim was to promote the ratification of the trade treaty signed with Campino; in Bolivia, to settle the issue of mercury imports from Huancavelica (a Peruvian city he believed to be on Bolivian territory). With regard to Paraguay, which did not maintain diplomatic relations with Mexico, there was no specific objective other than to try to get it to participate in the “global agenda”.

**Itinerant embassies**

Diez de Bonilla left for Chiapas at the middle of 1831, collected the necessary information on the border lines of the time of the Spanish colony, and arrived in Guatemala in November. He met Pedro Molina, former Plenipotentiary to the Panama Congress, who had become Secretary of State and Foreign Affairs. Molina accepted the four agreements proposed by the Mexican envoy: trade treaty, border treaty, appointment of representatives to the Assembly, and the choice of Tacubaya as the seat of the Congress (SRE, 1962, p. 143-147). Unfortunately, negotiations remained frozen as the idea of arbitration in the event of a conflict was being put off. The, in April 1832 the Mexican representation was attacked by a mob overheated by territorial disputes, and Diez de Bonilla asked his government be relieved from his duties. By January 1833, the Mexican government officially informed the Central American Federation and Colombia that Diez de Bonilla’s mission had ended. The Family Pact will leave no trace on these two countries, except for one sign: in 1835, the policy of rapprochement with Guatemala was built on the Diez de Bonilla experience (SRE, 1962, p. 158-159).

Cañedo’s embassy was to last longer and embody the essence of the Family Pact. After his departure from Mexico in July 1831, he stayed several months in the United States, then crossed the Isthmus of Panama and arrived in Callao on April 12, 1832. After a meeting with the President Agustín Gamarra, Cañedo decided to make Lima the seat of his embassy; he undoubtedly thought that his work would require more time than that of Diez de Bonilla; he was not mistaken, but he was far from imagining its length.

At the first glance, he learnt that Peru had just concluded a treaty with Ecuador, whose article 3 stipulated a quadruple alliance: Bolivia - Chile - Ecuador - Peru. In August, he passed this news to his government and explained that Lima was competing with Mexico City to become the “Capital of Spanish-American
representatives" (SRE, 1962, p. 178). He also remarked a small personal victory: although the Peruvian chambers rejected Alamán’s invitation, deeming relations with immediate neighbors were more important, he managed to persuade President Gamarra to change his position in favor of a general confederation (SRE, 1962, p. 178). In November, Cañedo presented a draft of the treaty to José María Pando (also a former delegate to the Congress of Panama, by then Minister of Foreign Affairs), and on 16 November both signed the treaty, which was ratified shortly afterwards by the chambers of the host country (SRE, 1962, p. 190-195).

With this ratification and the legislative approval of the treaty signed with Chile, the Mexican envoy felt that he was on the right track. But not for long: when he decided to take action and organize the Assembly, he met the reluctance of Lima (which proposed that the Assembly be held in Guayaquil) and of Santiago, where he went in October 1833; according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joaquín Tocornal, this government preferred “direct state-to-state negotiations”, because they had two advantages”: easier settlements and better adaptation to particular situations (AHI, 2003, p. 88). Bolivia presented the same objections as Chile, Argentina claimed that circumstances did not allow it to attend the Congress, and Brazil expressed its interest in bilateral and Pan-American relations, including the United States.

The Peru-Bolivia Confederation, which operated between 1836 and 1839, gave Cañedo the opportunity to restart the Family Pact. The new country was a concrete expression of the Andean Federation proposed by Bolivar following the failure of the Panamanian amphictyony and integrated Upper and Lower Peru, territories that had been a single unit until the creation of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires in 1776. In 1836, Cañedo proposed to Marechal Andrés de Santa Cruz the extension of the trade treaty that had just been signed with Pando to the whole Confederation. The “Protector” accepted the idea but appointed as plenipotentiary Manuel Vidaurre, another the former delegate to the Congress of Panama and Pando’s opponent. In few occasions, Vidaurre rejected the text as well as its reworkings on the pretext that they were contrary to the interests of his country and ended up cancelling the project.

These complications, coupled with the departure of Chancellor Alamán and the lack of resources, start derailing everything Cañedo had achieved so far. But the imminent loss of Texas prompted the Mexican parliament to take a closer look at the Amphictyonic project and tried to be more purposeful. The Family Pact’s
regional standpoints were replaced by growing concerns over the U.S. expansionism threat. In a press release of 5 August 1835, the chamber urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to convene the “General Assembly of America” in the shortest possible time to strengthen Mexico’s international position. Shortly afterwards Texas proclaimed its independence and the country plunged into a long period of political instability and economic crisis. By 1837, the government was not convinced by the Family Pact and no longer sent instructions to Cañedo.

New wave of diplomatic efforts

Two years later, the blockade of the port of Veracruz in 1839 by the French fleet revived the desire of Mexican parliamentarians for a confederal assembly. After a plenary debate, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies voted on 26 July in favor of the Hispano-American alliance initiative (SRE, 1962, p. 285-287). Cañedo took advantage of this: having recently returned to Mexico and become a member of the government, he issued a new invitation on 6 August, the anniversary of the Battle of Junín. It was addressed to Chile, Buenos Aires, Ecuador, New Grenada, Venezuela and Uruguay, while a separate note was addressed to Peru, Bolivia and the Central American Federation. He was aware that a meeting in Tacubaya was no longer of much relevance to his partners, he put the headquarters issue aside, and concentrated all his efforts on the need to convene the Assembly “for the greatness and happiness of all America” (SRE, 1962, p. 290).

The invitation of Cañedo was favorably received by a significant number of republics. New Grenada agreed to appoint its representatives, and although it had offered its country as the seat of the Congress, accepted Tacubaya in November 1839 (SRE, 1962, p. 295-296). Ecuador also agreed to participate and offered to host the Congress in Quito (SRE, 1962, p. 297). Chile, several months after having invaded and destroyed the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, also accepted and recommended the city of Lima for gathering the Congress (SRE, 1962, p. 298-299). Finally, Bolivia justified its agreement by the need to have “a public law [able to] govern the States of America and strengthen their bonds of friendship” (SRE, 1962, p. 299-300).
However, there were also setbacks. In the first place, Venezuelans refused to participate because these “simple meetings” were “ineffective and superfluous” in resolving the security problems of the Spanish-American countries (SRE, 1962, p. 305-313). Brazil, for its part, replied on 27 July 1841 by stipulating that their choice of venue for the Assembly was Rio de Janeiro or, failing that, Lima (AHI, 2003, p. 154-155). Another problem to be resolved: how to avoid inviting the United States without affecting the relationship with that country. One idea was put forward, inspired by the Bolivarian bilateral treaties: two-sided agreements should be drafted and then merged. The other option was to announce that invitations were limited to countries south of the Isthmus, but it was rejected because of Mexico, a country “that has made so much effort to implement this initiative” (AHI, 2003, p. 153). In fact, the United States was unambiguous about its lack of interest. When asked about attending the Congress, the U.S. Chargé d’Affairs in Santiago said that if an invitation were to reach him, he would hand it over to his government “without showing the slightest enthusiasm”. Since Thomas Jefferson’s inaugural address in 1801, his country had made it clear that it would not join any alliance (AHI, 2003, p. 152-153).

The Brazilian monarchy’s reply was more complex. In 1840, Brazil’s representative in Santiago, Miguel Maria Lisboa, was informed of plans to reconvene an “American Congress” (AHI, 2003, p. 71). In a confidential memo, Lisboa advised his government to participate in order to become a full member of the “American family” and to defend Brazilian interests in the drawing of borders. To convince his government, he argued that a break with Bolivia was not impossible on the border issue, and he recalled the risks of having the Peru-Bolivia Confederation led by Santa Cruz as a neighbor. He anticipated that in the event of a conflict, the war will be fought on land and sea, hence the Brazilian military’s interest involved the contacts with “a willing ally”, namely Chile, an enemy of the Confederation of Upper and Lower Peru (AHI, 2003, p. 72).10

The denouement came at the beginning of 1839. By then, Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, Brazilian Chargé d’Affairs in Lima, learned from Cañedo that the invitations to the Congress were sent only to the Spanish-American republics. The Brazilian diplomat pointed out that “the Empire will not give up its legitimate rights to participate in the Assembly if it takes place” (although he was convinced that it would never meet) (AHI, 2003, p. 78). Cañedo replied that in the past he had not been in favor of Brazil’s presence, but the new circumstances justify the country’s
participation. And if one of the republics did not agree, added the Mexican, he promised to ensure that one of the Assembly’s first decisions will be to welcome Brazil (AHI, 2003, p. 78).

The last Mexican mission

After these consultations, time passed without seeing any progress. In order to avoid another failure, General Santa Anna appointed Manuel Crescencio Rejón, a leading constitutional expert, as Mexico’s representative to the Spanish-American countries and Brazil. His official and secret instructions, signed by José María Bocanegra in May 1842, took up Alamán’s ideas, ensuring that Rejón’s embassy remained in line with the Family Pact and the aim of “giving this continent the importance and respectability it deserves” (SRE, 1962, p. 316-321). Before launching the mission, Bocanegra asked Minister Rejón to obtain the adhesion of at least five delegations on five objectives: to establish relations of friendship and trade between the countries of the region; to establish common relations with the Vatican; to sign treaties with European countries; to build a common defense; and to resolve the disputes among the Spanish-American countries.

Rejón embarked in June 1842 and arrived on the Venezuelan coast after an eventful crossing. In Caracas, he presented his credentials to General José Antonio Páez, who was elected President of Venezuela for the second time. To facilitate his efforts, Rejón settled in Caracas, but soon realized that Páez was hostile to any confederation undertaking. In November, he informed his government that the Venezuelan government was not only opposed to the project, but that it was trying by all means to prevent other delegates from meeting in Lima, the city that had already been accepted by most of the republics as the seat of the new American Assembly (SRE, 1962, p. 330-331). According to the existing documents, Páez’s distrust was due to the General Santa Anna’s alleged aims of regional supremacy, and because he was convinced that Mexico was seeking help to recover Texas at the risk of dragging its allies into a perilous adventure (SRE, 1962, p. 324-329). Another reason, undeclared but important, was Páez’s concern not to quarrel with the British crown, which rejected “any project of offensive or defensive alliance” among the new republics (SRE, 1962, p. 331).

Rejón left Venezuela in early 1843 after informing his government that, besides Mexico, six other countries wished to attend the American Congress: New
Grenada, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Buenos Aires and Brazil (pp. 345-346). Knowing that the Assembly would eventually meet in Lima, Chancellor Bocanegra asked Rejón to travel to Peru “to present himself as the Mexican delegate with the power to negotiate” (CUEVAS, 1962, p. 80); unfortunately, his letter did not reach its destination. Leaving Caracas, Rejón went back to Mexico crossing Central America to convince other countries to participate in the Assembly. In March 1843, he received another message from Bocanegra, this time ordering him to abandon any ecumenical efforts and return to Mexico: the country had limited means and its government preferred to use them to recover Texas and Yucatan.

This decision had serious consequences: four years later, the Amphictyonic Assembly would finally be held without the country that had worked for its installation during twelve years (Table 1). This abandonment will also mark the beginning of a gradual shift in the Confederal attempts towards the south of the American continent.

The American Congress is held in Lima

The Confederation promoted until 1843 by Mexico resurfaced two years later when Juan José Flores, the deposed president of Ecuador, asked the help of Queen Mary Christina of Spain to regain his authority. This initiative alarmed the Hispano-American governments who saw a risk of monarchical restoration and the re-establishment of Spain’s maritime power on the Pacific coast.12 Cipriano Zegarra, a member of the Peruvian representation in Quito, noted that the Flores plan favored the interference of ‘European diplomacy’ and imposed two risks on the region: an intervention that would go beyond the borders of Ecuador, but also and European action that could destroy the republican institutions (ULLOA, 1938, p. 159-160). Other ambassadors shared the same fears: The Argentine minister in London, Manuel Moreno, reported that the project was to restore the monarchical regime in four countries: Ecuador, New Grenada, Peru and Bolivia (pp. 8-9). According to the Brazilian source, Antonio de Souza, the Empire’s representative in Lima, the plan involved only three countries (Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru) (AHI, 2003, p. 221).

Flores invasion did not take place, but it convinced Hispano-Americans of the urgency of a Confederal Assembly. On November 9, 1846, José Paz Soldán, Peru’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent an invitation which, for the first time in twenty years, was finally successful. It was addressed to Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, New
Grenada, Venezuela, Argentina, Mexico and Central America, as well as Brazil and the United States (ULLOA, 1938, p. 179-180).

The American Congress in Lima began its work in December 1847 in the house of the Peruvian delegate. The Assembly had five delegates. Manuel Ferreyros, the former foreign minister of Peru in 1835 and president of the Assembly; José de Ballivián, former president of Bolivia; Pablo Merino, former secretary of the congress of Guayaquil; Diego Benavente, until then vice-president of the Junta of Concepción; and Juan de Francisco Martín, Bolivar’s executor. After twenty-one sessions, the ministers signed four treaties of political union establishing an Amphictyonic confederation.

The context, the goals and the final failure of this project are quite well known by historians, as well as the North American War, which took place almost simultaneously on Mexican territory. Following the signing of the Lima Conventions, the Assembly instructed Chile to send the treaties to the government of Buenos Aires and to convince it to accede to them. Ecuador was charged with an identical mission to the Central American Federation, New Grenada to Venezuela and Mexico, while Peru was charged with persuading Brazil. As for the United States, the plenipotentiaries decided that the conclusions of the Congress would be communicated to them “when the governments of the Confederate Republics will deem it appropriate”. Needless to say, the minister of New Grenada had nowhere to send the treaties to the Mexican government because the country was occupied by U.S. troops.

**Final Remarks**

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, proclaimed on July 4, 1848, implied the amputation of half of the Mexican territory, while the political instability asphyxiated its recovery projects. The north of the country was still under attack from filibusters, and on the external level, Mexico had to concentrate its energies on the recovery of the Yucatan. When the next attempts of Spanish-American union were organized in 1856 (the Continental Treaty of Santiago) and 1865 (the Second American Congress in Lima), Mexico would be absent. In both cases it backed the appeal, and these initiatives included the Mexican international situation as part of their motivations. That said, the Family Pact stands out as the last and most important Mexican diplomatic undertaking in favor of a confederal integration.
During its first stages it involved Bolivarian goals of union of the ancient provinces of Spanish America, as well as the need to control U.S. desires of territorial expansionism. Throughout the next stages, these objectives were condensed into one: a self-defense strategy against the growing external threat.

Focusing on the regional picture, the Family Pact’s efforts over more than a decade, complications and constant setbacks, can be considered paramount in understanding the unionist vacuum between 1831 and 1847 and highlight some of the little-known facts of the period. They facilitate the revival of the Confederal ideal, and laid the foundations for the American Congress of Lima in 1847. All the aspects considered, the Family Pact contributes to a better understanding of the complexity of the early stages of the Inter-American System, and its tattering formation.

### Table 1
Country targets during the Family Pact Missions

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* From 1837 to 1839: War against the Peru-Bolivia Confederation

Source: SRE (1902) and AHI (2003).

### NOTAS

1. In order of arrival, the Plenipotentiary ministers were: José María Pando (replaced by Manuel Pérez de Tudela) and Manuel Vidaurre (Peru); Pedro Gual and Pedro Briceño Méndez (Colombia); Pedro Molina and Antonio Larrazábal (Central America); José Mariano Michelena and José Domínguez Manso (Mexico). Two European observers joined these ministers: Edward James Dawkins (Great Britain) and Jan Verveer (Netherlands). For their biography, see CLARE (1967).
2. Monographs on Alamán’s diplomatic initiative are relatively rare. Among recent works, see: HERRERA (2013); MENDEZ REYES (1996) and VAZQUEZ (1991, p. 545-570). Also relevant are: ALAMÁN (1938) himself and KITCHENS (1972).

3. The plan to federate the Hispano-American republics took shape in 1821, when Simon Bolivar sent two emissaries to Central and South America with the mission of signing bilateral treaties of “Union, alliance and perpetual confederation”. Joaquin Mosquera signed the first treaty in June 1822 with Bernardo Monteagudo, the Peruvian Foreign affairs minister, and a second treaty in October 1823 with two representatives of Chile, Joaquin Echeverria and José Antonio Rodriguez. He left immediately for Buenos Aires, and signed with Bernardino Rivadavia an alliance agreement with vague and non-confederal commitments. Miguel Santamaria signed the third treaty in Mexico City in October 1823 with Lucas Alamán and in March 1825, Pedro Molina signed the fourth one on behalf of Central America with Pedro Gual, then Minister of Foreign Affairs. These treaties are the cornerstone of the Congress of Panama and reflect the Amphictyonic principle conceived by Bolivar (REZA, 2014, p. 15-17).

4. Tratado de Amistad y Comercio entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y la República de Chile (SRE, 1962, p. 111-117). This norm is also known as “Andrés Bello”, the Venezuelan humanist who served as strategist for the Chilean diplomacy. The same objective was found in the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Chile and the United States signed in 1832. Article 12 of the annex thus justified the Hispano-American preference: “It is understood by both parties that these exceptions will (...) apply to all the new nations of the former Spanish America, regardless of the changes made to their constitutions, names and borders, including the States of Uruguay and Paraguay, which were grouped together in the former Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires; including also the States of New Grenada, Venezuela and Ecuador, formerly part of the Republic of Colombia, as well as any new States that may emerge from the present States” (BELLO, 1981, p. 341).

5. Following the bankruptcy of the Goldschmidt Bank and the loss of the Colombian assets, in 1826, Vicente Rocafuerte, a member of the Mexican representation in London, came to the rescue of his Colombian counterpart by asking Barclay, Herring & Co. to deliver 63,000 pounds sterling to the Colombian. In 1834, the States that emerged from Colombia agreed to share the debt among themselves, but without being able to repay it. Thirty years later, Mexico ceded the debt to the Martinez del Rio Bank (RAMIREZ, 1930, p. 221-222).

6. This position can be attributed to Andrés Bello. Upon his arrival in Chile in 1829, he was appointed “Oficial Mayor” in the Ministry of Finance, although he exercised his talents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was then appointed “Oficial Mayor” for External Relations from 1834 to 1852 (CRUCHAGÁ, 1919, p. 78; 1935). At the beginning of his stay in Chile, he considered the idea of the Congress “as a beautiful utopia, but sterile for our America”. During the preparations for the Lima Congress of 1847, he changed his mind and thought that even if the Assembly did not produce all the expected results, “if some were to be achieved, that would be enough to justify its existence”; indeed, “the subjects to be dealt with by the future congress are of such importance that a [simple] advance would compensate the costs and efforts brought to this meeting” (BELLO, 1954, p. 641).

7. According to Article 2 of the “Ley Fundamental”, the objective of the Peru-Bolivia Confederation was the “maintenance of the internal security of the confederated republics and their respective independence”. Although this wording refers to a confederal system, the details announced a federal model. The “Ley” established a common citizenship and a central government structured into three branches: executive, judicial and legislative. The Senate was composed of 15 members, five from each state; all were appointed by the “Supreme Head of the Confederation”. The House of Representatives consisted of 21 persons elected by the Confederate Congress from the members of the national chambers. The powers of the Executive, in turn, were broad but consistent with the political model: The Executive directed foreign policy, the army and the navy; it was responsible for the
administration of customs and posts. It appointed prosecutors, and the presidents of the states were appointed by the Supreme Leader from a list presented by each national congress. Based on the Amphictyonic model, the Assembly have to meet every two years for 50 days, renewable, and in different capitals (CPB, 1837).

8. Cañedo to Andrés de Santa Cruz, Lima, November 14, 1836; Manuel L. Vidaurre to Cañedo, Lima, January 4, 1837; Contraproyecto de Tratado entre México y la Confederación Perú-Boliviana (SRE, 1962, p. 244-245, 248-250, 250-255).

9. Cañedo to the Chancellors of six Republics; Cañedo to Chancellor of Peru; Cañedo to Chancellor of Bolivia (August 6, 1839); Cañedo to Chancellor of the Central American Federation (August 31, 1839) (SRE, 1962, p. 289-292, 294-295).

10. After the fall of the Confederation led by Santa Cruz, Lisboa made short changes in his arguments. He considered that Brazil’s absence from Congress “would present dangers to the interests of the Empire (...) and that its presence will be useful to Brazil as it was to America”. He believed that his country could play a “moderating” role between the European countries and the new republics. Lisboa to the Government of Brazil, Santiago, 10 July 1839 and 26 July 1840 (AHI, 2003, p. 96-97, 134-135).

11. Also see: Ramón Regifo to Chargé d’Affairs of Brazil, Santiago, April 10, 1842 (AHI, 2003, p. 160.

12. For a detailed analysis on the Flores’ planned invasion, see: HASKINS (1947, p. 467-495) and AKEN (1989).

REFERENCES


Germán A. de la Reza é Professor do Departamento de Produção Econômica da Universidade Autónoma Metropolitana (UAM), câmpus Xochimilco, no México. Professor colaborador no Programa de Pós-Graduação em História da Faculdade de Ciências e Letras da Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho (UNESP), câmpus de Assis, Brasil. Doutor em Ciências Econômicas pela Universidade de Paris II – Panthéon e Doutor em Filosofia e História pela Universidade de São Paulo.
Universidade de Toulouse – Le Mirail. Investigador Nacional do Sistema Nacional de Investigadores (S.N.I.), nível III.

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